# Transcript: The art of deception across centuries ## Description Disinformation is not an invention of the internet. It has been spreading since ancient times—in the form of rumors, legends, and deliberately distorted stories. What changes, however, are the tools, speed, and reach. Today, we stand at the threshold of a new chapter being written by artificial intelligence.This lecture traces the development of manipulation and propaganda techniques over time—from oral tradition through mass media to sophisticated social media campaigns. Using concrete examples, it shows what they have in common, how they differ, and what challenges the future holds. Who is Tomáš Kolomazník Tomáš Kolomazník is co-founder and director of the consulting firm Center for Security Consulting. He specializes in security policy, the defense industry, cyber and information security. He is a member of the security community at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Alumni Association. He participates in international projects, speaks at conferences, and publishes on security topics both domestically and abroad. In the past, he worked at the Ministry of Defense. Currently, he is also involved in teaching, mainly at private universities. He is co-author of the book "Why we believe disinformation?", published in our country and in London, and the book Deceptions and manipulation across the centuries, published this year in Prague. ## Transcript **[00:00:00]** Why we believe misinformation—the brain just reacts to emotional posts and information laundering. **[00:00:06]** The STB didn't come up with it originally. **[00:00:08]** We talk about COVID as the first infodemic; there is a connection between **[00:00:12]** young people radicalizing on social media and then carrying out physical attacks. **[00:00:18]** History is characterized by people never learning from it. **[00:00:24]** Let me briefly introduce myself. **[00:00:29]** My main activity is, **[00:00:34]** I am co-owner and co-founder of the Center for Security Consulting, **[00:00:39]** a small company focused on security consulting **[00:00:44]** covering a wide range of topics, **[00:00:49]** whether in municipal or urban security, **[00:00:51]** but recently, or for several years now, our center has focused heavily on **[00:00:57]** security and issues in the information space. **[00:01:01]** We collaborate with various platforms, **[00:01:05]** both on a non-paid and paid basis. **[00:01:11]** Currently, we have many contacts and clients in the United States, **[00:01:19]** where it’s no secret that global platforms monitor developments **[00:01:25]** in the Czech Republic, not only in the Czech Republic, **[00:01:28]** but in the European Union as a whole. **[00:01:30]** They are interested in legislation, attitudes, **[00:01:35]** who actually appears on their platforms, **[00:01:40]** which politicians use them, and so on. **[00:01:43]** This is the main focus of our research here, **[00:01:47]** in the Central European region, in the Central European context. **[00:01:52]** At the same time, my colleagues and I also engage in publishing, **[00:01:59]** lecturing, and we also publish books. **[00:02:02]** About two years ago, a book was published called **[00:02:06]** Why We Believe Misinformation, which we wrote together with Štefan Sarvaš, **[00:02:12]** who some of you, especially in marketing communication, **[00:02:16]** might know because he works for foreign consulting firms. **[00:02:23]** And also with my colleague Zdeněk Rod from the company, **[00:02:26]** who focuses a lot on security issues, **[00:02:29]** we wrote this book, **[00:02:31]** because at that time there was a lot of discussion about misinformation, **[00:02:35]** a lot of discussion about strategic communication, **[00:02:38]** and basically there was no comprehensive view on these topics. **[00:02:44]** We approached it in a somewhat looser form, **[00:02:47]** so it wouldn’t be just a purely academic text. **[00:02:50]** The book attracted attention and was eventually published by a London publisher, **[00:02:54]** so we had to quickly translate it. **[00:02:57]** And this year, my colleague Zdeněk Rod and I published a book **[00:03:02]** Deceptions and Manipulations Across the Centuries, **[00:03:05]** which is actually the topic I will want to focus on during this lecture. **[00:03:12]** This book somewhat follows up on the book Why We Believe Disinformation, **[00:03:17]** but we tried to show the historical context, **[00:03:21]** how it all started. **[00:03:24]** And this book is not really for a general audience, **[00:03:30]** but for those interested in the topic. **[00:03:33]** It contains many examples from history and also some outlooks, **[00:03:39]** on how it might develop in the future, **[00:03:43]** or how it will develop, with various opinions. **[00:03:47]** So this is basically our second part, **[00:03:51]** of the activities we are working on and currently addressing. **[00:03:58]** As Honza said at the beginning, he has been feeling a bit down since Monday, **[00:04:03]** seeing what is actually happening in this space. **[00:04:07]** And of course, some will tell you, **[00:04:10]** don't read the daily news, **[00:04:13]** try to create some mental balance, **[00:04:16]** and distance yourself from the flood of news and so on. **[00:04:21]** So these are often royal advice. **[00:04:25]** At the start, I want to say, **[00:04:28]** why we are currently dealing with the topic at all, **[00:04:33]** of disinformation, conspiracy theories, various deceptions, **[00:04:37]** different information operations, and so on. **[00:04:41]** Years ago, this topic became a security issue. **[00:04:47]** Something we call securitization in professional jargon. **[00:04:52]** Disinformation became securitized, **[00:04:56]** it became a security risk for society. **[00:05:01]** Just like the potential threat of a nuclear apocalypse. **[00:05:10]** There is the threat of resource shortages, the threat of migration, **[00:05:15]** the threat of food shortages, and so on. **[00:05:20]** The same problem exists with disinformation **[00:05:24]** and conspiracy theories and these phenomena, **[00:05:28]** where disinformation truly becomes a problem for us **[00:05:34]** and threatens our society. **[00:05:37]** And it is addressed not only here, as we hear, **[00:05:41]** that the situation after the 2025 elections has somewhat changed. **[00:05:47]** The current government is somewhat reconsidering the approach. **[00:05:51]** At least in the first months, it indicates, **[00:05:54]** that it doesn't intend to fully focus on this topic again, **[00:06:00]** so it slightly breaks the line between what was here until 2025. **[00:06:06]** But if we went outside the Czech Republic, for example more to the west, **[00:06:11]** we would find that this topic is highly relevant in countries like Germany, **[00:06:17]** France, and the United Kingdom. **[00:06:20]** In these Western countries, this is being discussed. **[00:06:23]** It's also not entirely simple. **[00:06:26]** They also have resistance from various platforms, **[00:06:29]** which say things like, you are suppressing freedom of speech here and so on. **[00:06:34]** But the issue is not only Czech, it is. **[00:06:41]** I think if you went through some cases with them, **[00:06:47]** how they handle it abroad, for example in France or the UK, **[00:06:52]** you would be surprised. **[00:06:55]** And it really is a topic that is addressed not only by politicians, **[00:07:00]** but also by various security agencies. **[00:07:03]** So this is the context I wanted to mention here at the beginning. **[00:07:10]** When we reflected on this topic from a historical perspective, **[00:07:17]** I don't know who among you has gotten this book we wrote in hand, **[00:07:23]** but when we finished it, we realized, **[00:07:28]** that history is a history of manipulation. **[00:07:32]** We were somewhat surprised by that. **[00:07:35]** And here is my first question: to what extent do you think, **[00:07:41]** that political history is a history of manipulation. **[00:07:46]** Whether historical development reflects some manipulation, **[00:07:53]** and if this is a topic. **[00:08:00]** Here I see 100% agreement. **[00:08:08]** Sure, it's a leading question. **[00:08:13]** As I said, we consulted this with various experts, **[00:08:19]** who work in academia, and we came to the conclusion, **[00:08:24]** that at least political history is a history of some manipulation. **[00:08:30]** And manipulation doesn't have to be only negative, it can also be positive. **[00:08:35]** It can have positive effects as well. **[00:08:39]** I always give the example of 1989. **[00:08:43]** The spread of misinformation about the death of student Martin Šmíd, **[00:08:47]** which in a way was a catalyst for resistance **[00:08:53]** against the regime. **[00:08:57]** So this misinformation played a positive role. **[00:09:01]** Of course, we have many other examples, **[00:09:05]** which mostly play a negative role. **[00:09:08]** When you really go through history, **[00:09:12]** So there are many examples where, since ancient times, **[00:09:18]** people tried, whether in political activities **[00:09:25]** or military activities, they tried, **[00:09:29]** whether politicians or the army, **[00:09:33]** to manipulate in some way. **[00:09:37]** The name of the Chinese military leader **[00:09:43]** and first expert on information operations, Master Sun, is often mentioned. **[00:09:48]** There is even a book about it, widely cited, **[00:09:53]** and it is often taken as a model and its philosophy is drawn from. **[00:10:00]** His philosophy is based on the idea that it's not important **[00:10:06]** how the conflict ends, but that you want to win the war before it even starts, **[00:10:14]** meaning you break down the opponent somehow, **[00:10:19]** undermine the cohesion of their society, mislead their armies, **[00:10:24]** lower the morale of their soldiers, and so on. So before the conflict erupts, **[00:10:30]** you put the opponent at a disadvantage. **[00:10:36]** Today, what is much discussed is the cognitive domain, **[00:10:41]** the cognitive dimension, where the goal is no longer to physically destroy the society, **[00:10:52]** to cause casualties or material losses, **[00:10:56]** but to internally break down the society so that if a conflict occurs, **[00:11:03]** it cannot respond adequately. **[00:11:08]** All these ideas come from faraway China. **[00:11:14]** For example, the Trojan Horse legend, which is basically a legend, **[00:11:20]** a fictional story, because today people talk about Trojan horses, **[00:11:26]** fights, Trojan horses, and so on, but in reality, it's a myth, **[00:11:31]** and not even well documented, as there are theories **[00:11:36]** that the Trojan Horse never existed, that the army placed there **[00:11:42]** was not in the form of a Trojan horse but actually a ship, **[00:11:45]** because given what the Trojan horse looked like, it would have been very difficult **[00:11:52]** to fit soldiers inside, so the whole legend might be baseless. **[00:11:58]** I also picked from our history, which we often mention, **[00:12:06]** Charles IV, because Charles IV is a topic that about 20 years ago **[00:12:14]** was voted the greatest Czech in a poll. **[00:12:19]** It wasn't Jára Zimmermann, as many thought, but Charles IV, **[00:12:23]** and even he was a master of manipulation in the Middle Ages. **[00:12:29]** I don't know if anyone remembers the story of the False Valdemar from history, **[00:12:36]** where he supported, and I think of it as perhaps the first deepfake, **[00:12:42]** a precursor to deepfakes, where a fictional character **[00:12:49]** of a hermit was created, whom he made into the Brno Marco Rabiet, **[00:12:53]** and through this fictional character, he pushed his political interests. **[00:13:01]** Besides that, it is known that he also manipulated documents and so on. **[00:13:07]** And today, for example, the topic often opens up about Charles IV, **[00:13:11]** also in connection with the antisemitic pogroms that took place here in the Middle Ages. **[00:13:16]** Some even label Charles IV. as an antisemite, **[00:13:21]** claiming he was openly against the Jews, **[00:13:25]** because in 1348, 1349 there was a major pogrom against Jews, especially in Germany, **[00:13:32]** as Jews were accused of bringing the plague to Europe. **[00:13:37]** And Charles IV. basically did not protect them, **[00:13:41]** well, as a ruler he was supposed to ensure protection, that was his duty, but he did not protect them. **[00:13:46]** And he even supported the fact that the property confiscated from them, **[00:13:52]** or the property left behind by the Jews who were massacred, **[00:13:55]** was divided among the local townspeople and others. **[00:13:57]** So that's a historical analogy. **[00:14:03]** Of course, we have Napoleon here, another topic glorified a lot in France. **[00:14:11]** But when Napoleon was in power, he banned many publications, many newspaper titles. **[00:14:18]** Only about three or four newspaper titles were allowed, which were directly connected to him. **[00:14:24]** And he basically manipulated or created his image in France **[00:14:33]** and presented his successes as he needed. **[00:14:38]** So here you see, in these works, I of course have, for example, the Bible, **[00:14:43]** but I always say I would leave the Bible to Dan Brown, **[00:14:46]** because Dan Brown wrote a lot about the Bible. **[00:14:49]** And the very origin of the Bible is also quite mysterious, **[00:14:55]** how it came about, there are debates, the four Gospels, **[00:14:59]** some say it was the Hippocentaur, **[00:15:04]** others say it wasn't, that it was different, **[00:15:06]** and there are many inaccuracies in the translations and so on. **[00:15:09]** So that's the topic. **[00:15:12]** And if we move to a more recent time, **[00:15:15]** which is closer to us, then propaganda, **[00:15:20]** manipulation really reaches large dimensions, **[00:15:26]** which we know from the 20th century, whether it's the massive **[00:15:32]** spread of print, the rise of radio later, **[00:15:35]** the rise of television, and of course then the internet and so on. **[00:15:39]** So the 20th century is a kind of catalyst, **[00:15:43]** a time when the breeding ground for this is greatest, **[00:15:51]** we have the technical means to actually spread these messages. **[00:15:57]** Here you see from your perspective on the right a photo, **[00:16:04]** which is by Ferdinand Behr and surely, I don't know, many of you **[00:16:11]** know this image, it is Sarajevo, year 1914. **[00:16:17]** This photo was for about 30-40 years actually presented **[00:16:23]** as a photo of the arrest of Gavrilo Princip, **[00:16:27]** the assassin of Ferdinand Deste or his wife. **[00:16:32]** This was how it was presented for several decades, **[00:16:35]** but then it was actually discovered that it wasn't true, **[00:16:38]** that in the photo is his friend Ferdinand Behr, **[00:16:41]** who at the time, when the assassination happened, **[00:16:45]** and they tried to arrest him, went to help, **[00:16:48]** and the police were actually pulling him away or leading him off. **[00:16:52]** So it has nothing to do with Gavrilo Princip at all. **[00:16:56]** Yet until around 1948 or the 1940s, **[00:17:00]** it was presented as an authentic photo **[00:17:04]** of Gavrilo Princip's arrest. But it wasn't. **[00:17:08]** On the other side is a photo from the attack on the Winter Palace. **[00:17:13]** And again, anyone who remembers or went through education, **[00:17:23]** before 1989, when various films were shown, **[00:17:28]** authentic footage was presented as authentic footage **[00:17:34]** from the Great October Revolution. But those shots were staged. **[00:17:40]** They were staged films. In 1927 Eisenstein made the film **[00:17:46]** Ten Days That Shook the World, which said, **[00:17:52]** and that's how it was. And that's how it was presented everywhere, **[00:17:56]** how the attack on the Winter Palace and the takeover of power happened. **[00:18:02]** The same fiction is the shot from the Aurora. The signal from the Peter and Paul Fortress, **[00:18:07]** where they later tested whether it was even possible, **[00:18:12]** that someone signaled the Aurora with a lamp to fire. **[00:18:16]** It turned out that from the fortress they couldn't see the light on the Aurora at all. **[00:18:21]** So this was presented for several decades, until 1989, **[00:18:27]** as authentic footage, **[00:18:34]** which was not authentic footage at all. **[00:18:38]** The photo below is from Munich 1938, which was also long presented, **[00:18:45]** that when Chamberlain returned to Great Britain, **[00:18:49]** he waved a paper saying he was bringing peace, and it was widely interpreted **[00:18:54]** that the paper was the Munich Agreement. But it wasn't the Munich Agreement at all. **[00:19:00]** This was actually an agreement between Britain and Germany, **[00:19:05]** because when the talks in Munich ended at night, **[00:19:11]** Chamberlain went to Hitler's private apartment in Munich **[00:19:14]** and had him sign an agreement **[00:19:18]** about non-aggression and some potential cooperation. **[00:19:23]** He did this on his own initiative, and Hitler also did it on his own initiative. **[00:19:27]** He didn't inform many people around him about this agreement. **[00:19:32]** And when they signed this agreement, both the Germans and **[00:19:35]** Foreign Minister Ribbentrop were horrified, **[00:19:37]** Leader, you shouldn't have signed that. **[00:19:40]** Likewise, the British and France were terrified because they felt **[00:19:43]** excluded from the process, and at that time Adolf Hitler said, **[00:19:47]** 'But dear Ribbentrop, I only signed it so that the old man would have a signature from me as a keepsake.' **[00:19:51]** So this actually... **[00:19:56]** He waves around an agreement that is not the Munich Agreement. **[00:20:00]** How many times has that been misinterpreted? **[00:20:06]** In the 20th century, at the beginning of the 20th century, **[00:20:12]** professional propaganda was already starting, **[00:20:16]** with the spiritual father being Edward Bernays, **[00:20:21]** who is considered the founder of public relations, **[00:20:23]** mainly for smoothing relations between politicians, **[00:20:28]** businessmen, and the like. **[00:20:32]** What’s interesting here is I have a photo of a woman **[00:20:35]** from the 1920s and 30s. **[00:20:40]** In the 1920s, there was a lot of discussion because the tobacco industry, **[00:20:42]** with sales reaching quite high numbers, **[00:20:46]** was primarily targeting men, **[00:20:49]** and it was necessary to expand purchases and sales. **[00:20:53]** So they decided that women could start smoking too. **[00:20:55]** Bernays created campaigns about women's equality. **[00:21:00]** Why, if women are equal, or should be equal, **[00:21:04]** should they not be allowed to smoke? **[00:21:09]** So at that time, these campaigns promoting smoking among women were running, **[00:21:13]** which today, if you think about it, **[00:21:22]** that today there are almost no cigarette campaigns, **[00:21:24]** at most a pack or something, cigarette advertising is always banned. **[00:21:27]** But back then, this campaign existed, **[00:21:31]** where under the guise of equality, it was argued that women should also smoke. **[00:21:37]** There were also other campaigns, for example about nutrition, **[00:21:40]** where at that time they did things like asking doctors whether people should have a big breakfast. **[00:21:46]** And the doctor said, certainly, everyone should have a good breakfast. **[00:21:48]** And they took that to mean, **[00:21:52]** because in British English-speaking countries, people often ate eggs for breakfast, **[00:21:55]** sausages and similar, hot dogs. **[00:22:15]** So they said, yes, doctors simply recommend, **[00:22:18]** have a hearty breakfast, but today. **[00:22:23]** It's just a completely absurd thing. **[00:22:29]** In the 1930s, Nazism arrives, **[00:22:34]** and Józef Goebbels elevated propaganda to an art form. **[00:22:43]** There was a connection between propaganda and art, **[00:22:45]** propaganda and film, and so on. **[00:22:48]** And indeed, the Germans were able to influence a lot **[00:22:54]** probably because there was this connection, **[00:22:59]** that their rallies and large gatherings, **[00:23:02]** were like cinematic theater. **[00:23:07]** They often held them in the early evening, **[00:23:11]** there were fires, it was mystical, **[00:23:14]** with music by Richard Wagner and the like. **[00:23:17]** So the Germans managed, thanks to this, **[00:23:20]** and at that time, film was already in Germany, **[00:23:23]** and they began experimenting with television. **[00:23:27]** The 1936 Olympics had rooms **[00:23:33]** where people went to watch the first television broadcasts. **[00:23:36]** However, at that time, as they say, **[00:23:41]** Goebbels elevated it to an art form, **[00:23:45]** and propaganda gained a pejorative tone **[00:23:52]** and negative connotation. **[00:23:55]** That's why today, when we talk about propaganda, **[00:23:58]** a lot is said about propaganda. **[00:24:03]** It is strongly associated with the 20th century, **[00:24:05]** not only with Nazi Germany, but also **[00:24:08]** mainly with the Eastern Bloc, **[00:24:10]** the Soviet Union, and the socialist era. **[00:24:14]** That's why today, when there was a discussion before, **[00:24:16]** or it is still ongoing, **[00:24:19]** about strategic communication, everyone says, **[00:24:21]** it's basically propaganda. **[00:24:24]** So today, states try to avoid or not use **[00:24:29]** the label of propaganda, to tone it down and say, **[00:24:33]** yes, but today we have different tools, **[00:24:35]** we distinguish ourselves from the propaganda **[00:24:40]** that existed in the 20th century. **[00:24:44]** And basically, after the 1930s, the Cold War comes, **[00:24:52]** and here is always the rivalry between the two blocs, **[00:24:58]** who are trying not only on the military level, **[00:25:05]** economic, but also on the ideological level to build **[00:25:10]** a position and defeat each other. **[00:25:13]** It is definitely necessary to say here, **[00:25:20]** that intelligence services were involved, both on the Soviet side, **[00:25:26]** and on the American side. **[00:25:29]** At that time, the CIA paid many journalists, **[00:25:36]** who wrote favorable articles for newspapers. **[00:25:44]** Operation Drost aimed to have such court journalists. **[00:25:51]** On the Eastern side, it was a similar method. **[00:25:56]** In the Soviet Union, they actually set up some fictitious publishing houses **[00:26:01]** or supported some publishers in more left-leaning states. **[00:26:07]** For example, Italy is quite well known, **[00:26:09]** there were many such publishers **[00:26:11]** that were sponsored by the Soviet Union. **[00:26:19]** And actually, here is the lady I have in the photo, Mrs. Adentová, **[00:26:24]** who is a spiritual leader of the whole discussion **[00:26:31]** about politics vs. deception, **[00:26:35]** who, besides the Holocaust and other topics, **[00:26:39]** Germany and so on, dealt specifically with lying in politics. **[00:26:44]** And she actually opened this topic, saying that nowadays, **[00:26:49]** when we have television, film, periodicals, **[00:26:53]** politicians actually use this and politicians basically lie, **[00:26:58]** that politics in the 60s or for example the 60s and 70s **[00:27:03]** was actually based on lies. **[00:27:07]** And this topic was widely opened, **[00:27:12]** it was recycled again in connection with the rise of social networks, **[00:27:17]** but this was actually the first time, in the 60s, **[00:27:20]** that the topic of politicians lying was opened. **[00:27:24]** I have one more, or this gentleman in the photo, **[00:27:30]** is Mr. Mitrochin, a former KGB archive worker. **[00:27:36]** If you are interested in the history of the East, or the history of the KGB, **[00:27:42]** this man, when the KGB archive was moved to new premises, **[00:27:48]** while working as an archivist, he took notes, copied, **[00:27:52]** photographed various operations that the KGB carried out, **[00:27:56]** including in the information space, just like the operation mentioned here, **[00:28:01]** which is one of the classic cases of spreading the origin of HIV. **[00:28:10]** He copied all this and then, at the beginning of the 90s, **[00:28:18]** he escaped to the British and gave them this archive, **[00:28:21]** so there was a lot of information about, for example, the support of various intellectuals. **[00:28:28]** Of course, it was never fully proven that intellectuals, like Sartre, **[00:28:33]** who was rumored to have been sponsored by the KGB, **[00:28:36]** it was never fully proven that many of these intellectuals, even if left-leaning, **[00:28:44]** some had a stronger, more positive relationship with the Soviet Union, **[00:28:48]** which then, for example, in 1968 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, led to a certain outflow, **[00:28:54]** but this Mitrochin brought a lot of testimony. **[00:28:59]** There is the Black Lake case, which was revived a few years ago, **[00:29:04]** the case of retrieving crates from the Šumava lake, where archives were allegedly found about **[00:29:12]** some German and Austrian politicians being members of the NSDAP, **[00:29:20]** collaborating with the Gestapo, and it was actually at a time **[00:29:23]** when the 20-year statute of limitations was expiring in Germany, **[00:29:29]** and people who were somehow compromised by the former regime **[00:29:34]** could return, or might have been able to return, **[00:29:37]** but because this operation took place here, **[00:29:41]** and although nothing was found, Germany... **[00:29:45]** That wasn't the only reason, but it was another reason **[00:29:47]** why Germany extended the statute of limitations, because they got a bit unsettled. **[00:29:51]** But what is interesting or peculiar about this operation **[00:29:55]** is that the originators of the operation were not original. **[00:30:00]** The Czechoslovak STB did not invent it originally. **[00:30:07]** A year or two before, a similar action took place in Austria, **[00:30:12]** where allegedly false British pounds were retrieved from a lake, **[00:30:17]** because the Germans printed counterfeit pounds during World War II, **[00:30:22]** trying to support or devalue the British currency. **[00:30:29]** And from that, they replicated this procedure, **[00:30:33]** how to retrieve crates and what you might find there, **[00:30:36]** and they communicated this at the time. **[00:30:44]** So the Cold War, there are many examples of this in the Cold War, **[00:30:48]** but then the 1990s come and the internet and the turn of the millennium, **[00:30:54]** at that time Europe was affected by the war in the Balkans, **[00:31:00]** and one book came out here about it, very much about the question of propaganda **[00:31:09]** and the question of building media images of the enemy, **[00:31:17]** that is one side, and that is the other side, **[00:31:21]** but at that time a very interesting book was published **[00:31:23]** by Alvin Toffler, who wrote many books about technology, **[00:31:27]** for those of you who are technologically oriented, **[00:31:33]** like Future Shock, The Third Wave, The Information Society, and so on, **[00:31:35]** and at that time he generalized the functioning of propaganda **[00:31:41]** and the building of media images in the Balkan wars **[00:31:52]** And basically today, what he generalized there, **[00:31:55]** can also be applied to the war currently happening in Ukraine, **[00:32:01]** because he actually talks about the denigration **[00:32:06]** of the opponent in the information space. **[00:32:12]** There is metapropaganda, meaning distortion, **[00:32:17]** one side distorts the other side, accusing them of some kind of propaganda, **[00:32:20]** and that the propaganda is based on something completely false, and so on, **[00:32:26]** that it is actually a fight of ideologies, a fight of civilizations, **[00:32:31]** namely Christianity versus Orthodoxy. **[00:32:35]** Today we see that the Eurasian order, which is presented here by Putin, **[00:32:40]** on one side, and here he fights for the Eurasian order **[00:32:44]** against Western decadence and the Western faith style, **[00:32:50]** meaning he presents the center of these civilizations. **[00:32:56]** There are various revelations, whether in different mass graves and so on, **[00:33:01]** and one propaganda blames one side, the other blames the other side. **[00:33:06]** So this happened during the wars in the Balkans. **[00:33:10]** What happened and what is happening in the information space today, **[00:33:14]** is very similar. **[00:33:17]** The man in the middle is a high-ranking official of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **[00:33:22]** and about ten years ago he declared **[00:33:26]** at a conference that Russia wants to control the information space **[00:33:33]** and wants to be the main one, or for them, that represents a big issue **[00:33:39]** and it is key for them. **[00:33:42]** Which is happening even today, because they have many tools **[00:33:50]** on those platforms, various language mutations and so on, **[00:33:55]** sophisticated operations and the like. **[00:33:58]** So this really is a topic for them. **[00:34:02]** What actually happened to us with social networks and the connection with society **[00:34:08]** is the well-known example of Cambridge Analytica, **[00:34:12]** which actually revived discussions from the sixties, **[00:34:16]** when it was said, yes, politicians simply tend to manipulate, **[00:34:20]** and Cambridge Analytica was a typical example **[00:34:23]** of manipulation in politics. Who here is from marketing? **[00:34:27]** These are common marketing practices done in the form of **[00:34:31]** targeted ads, in the form of personalized advertising, **[00:34:35]** but in politics this was simply not accepted in America, **[00:34:39]** and so the company, Cambridge Analytica, actually **[00:34:45]** went bankrupt, yes, it changed today, **[00:34:49]** it just operates under a different name now. **[00:34:52]** So basically social, the connectivity, internet, social networks **[00:34:57]** It brings us a significant shift, whether in the security area, **[00:35:02]** or in politics. **[00:35:06]** Connecting people actually enables, these are well-known conclusions, **[00:35:14]** a more flexible and faster distribution of any content. **[00:35:24]** There are three, I would say, phenomena here. **[00:35:29]** One of these phenomena is memes. **[00:35:33]** Some say we are in a memetic war. **[00:35:36]** Memes are visual representations, **[00:35:40]** that tell us a story or give us some context, **[00:35:45]** because it is proven that visually you remember things better, **[00:35:50]** or if a story is told, you remember the story better. **[00:35:55]** This is a meme from the time of Donald Trump's first campaign, **[00:36:02]** where he tried to discredit Hillary Clinton and communicated that **[00:36:09]** Hillary Clinton wanted equal rights for women in the military, **[00:36:13]** and his team twisted it so that **[00:36:16]** after her election, women would have to serve in the military. **[00:36:24]** So in this way, they created a quick message, **[00:36:28]** added some images, and spread it on social networks. **[00:36:34]** Deepfake videos are a very sensitive topic today, **[00:36:40]** which I will go into a bit more detail about later. **[00:36:44]** Today we have artificial intelligence and language models. **[00:36:49]** These three phenomena and areas fundamentally change things for us, **[00:36:57]** and we are entering a stage called the attention economy. **[00:37:08]** It is the attention economy, and it means **[00:37:12]** that the goal of today's platforms is not just to connect people, **[00:37:17]** but to keep them locked in that space as much as possible and keep them there. **[00:37:25]** The goal is for you to spend a lot of time on social networks. **[00:37:33]** And this is because the more time you spend there, **[00:37:36]** they have more arguments for various advertisers, **[00:37:42]** and can earn more money from them. **[00:37:45]** At the same time, you encounter products, **[00:37:49]** online shops, and so on, so it is a source of income. **[00:37:53]** However, what is happening, and this is a trend today **[00:38:00]** among teenagers and young people, **[00:38:04]** is that it has opened a discussion about why **[00:38:09]** or whether we should restrict access to social networks until a certain age, **[00:38:15]** around 16 years old, discussions mention 18, 15, 16 years, **[00:38:20]** these discussions exist, some countries have already taken steps, **[00:38:24]** like Australia, France is talking about it intensively, **[00:38:27]** it is discussed in Europe and also here with us, **[00:38:31]** but basically it's about the fact that you actually get into a kind of bubble, **[00:38:37]** and when you are not, and that's exactly the problem with the young ones, **[00:38:40]** who don't really have the reflection of physical life, **[00:38:46]** like we do, but they actually get into that bubble **[00:38:52]** and it basically lowers, the brain just reacts **[00:38:56]** to emotional posts, it works very shortcut-driven, **[00:39:03]** and basically doesn't develop critical thinking **[00:39:07]** and doesn't develop the thought processes in young people. **[00:39:12]** So today this topic is actually about platforms **[00:39:18]** and the topic of algorithms, where there is pressure, whether from the European Union, **[00:39:24]** or the act that is here in the Czech Republic, **[00:39:29]** the Digital Service Act from the European Union, **[00:39:33]** which is still in the process of implementation here today, **[00:39:36]** where platforms would have to somehow disclose **[00:39:45]** or declare how the algorithm is set up and how it actually works. **[00:39:48]** So that's a big topic. **[00:39:56]** The problem, for example, why there is discussion about young people only having access to social networks from a certain age, **[00:40:00]** is the radicalization of youth, because there is evidence or a link between **[00:40:12]** young people being radicalized on social networks and then carrying out attacks, **[00:40:25]** physical attacks outside of that space. **[00:40:32]** So today, years ago, radicalizing a young person **[00:40:37]** might have taken several weeks, watching videos on YouTube and so on, **[00:40:45]** but today, because of the situation on social networks, **[00:40:52]** it can happen in a matter of days, they say, that people get radicalized **[00:40:56]** or at least social networks provide the catalyst for radicalization. **[00:41:02]** So these are the challenges we face because of this, **[00:41:10]** even though we are connected and can get a lot of information in real time, **[00:41:16]** it also brings risks, and today it's not just Europe **[00:41:21]** that is taking steps with restrictions or already has restrictions, **[00:41:28]** networks are restricted, and global platforms criticize this. **[00:41:33]** Politicians, of course, on one hand say, yes, we support limiting it, **[00:41:38]** but on the other hand, they use the networks extensively. Remember the discussion **[00:41:42]** about TikTok, which is problematic because it's backed by China, **[00:41:48]** so it shouldn't be used, but today in the Czech Republic, the vast majority of politicians, **[00:41:53]** especially before elections, you find that basically 80-90% of politicians in the Czech Republic **[00:41:59]** or at least the leaders had an account on TikTok. **[00:42:08]** And they actually operated and used TikTok. **[00:42:16]** So it's a two-sided issue because some say, **[00:42:32]** that we have to restrict something, we will ban this, **[00:42:36]** but on the other hand, politicians also use this a lot. **[00:42:43]** As I mentioned, a real phenomenon of recent times **[00:42:52]** are deepfake videos portraying authentic figures. **[00:43:02]** This is because we now have technological development, big data, **[00:43:06]** and technologies that can fabricate this **[00:43:11]** and prepare it from that. **[00:43:13]** Take Barack Obama, for example, this video from 2017, **[00:43:18]** which was talked about as a high-quality deepfake video, **[00:43:24]** and it was kind of the first test balloon of deepfake videos. **[00:43:30]** And then the use of deepfake videos. **[00:43:34]** Here is a very well-known case between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, **[00:43:41]** where on Twitch, a gaming platform, a 24-hour discussion ran, **[00:43:46]** an artificially generated discussion of two puppets, **[00:43:50]** who debated various political topics for 24 hours, **[00:43:55]** attacking and mocking each other. **[00:43:57]** And that was an artificial discussion. **[00:44:01]** We have also identified many or several deepfake videos here, **[00:44:07]** for example during the presidential campaign, **[00:44:10]** a video with the current president, Petr Pavel, **[00:44:16]** with Mr. Fiala, but also videos with Andrej Babiš, **[00:44:22]** offering some products. **[00:44:24]** There are many such videos abroad as well, especially in Poland. **[00:44:29]** Polish politicians were similarly used **[00:44:33]** to offer some investment products. **[00:44:36]** It happened in Romania, Croatia, and Slovakia too. **[00:44:39]** Fake phone calls during election campaigns. **[00:44:44]** What can also be done is placing fake videos **[00:44:50]** back into history. **[00:44:53]** There is a video to be found where President Nixon gives a speech about **[00:45:02]** the moon mission failing, that the astronauts died there, **[00:45:07]** that they did not return. **[00:45:10]** It is true that during the American moon mission, **[00:45:16]** Nixon had two prepared speeches. **[00:45:19]** One speech was for success, and the other was **[00:45:22]** for failure, and that was prepared. **[00:45:25]** It succeeded, so the celebratory speech was broadcast. **[00:45:30]** But somewhere they found the speech about failure **[00:45:34]** and made a video where he says **[00:45:38]** that it actually failed. And today this is spreading on the networks **[00:45:41]** Various conspiracy theories claim that the Americans were **[00:45:44]** actually never on the moon. Because today, a significant percentage **[00:45:47]** of Americans still believe that America was not actually **[00:45:51]** on the moon, that it was fiction filmed in a TV studio, **[00:45:55]** and the spread of such videos greatly influences **[00:46:04]** and supports these deepfake theories. **[00:46:10]** So even today, including the Czech Republic, **[00:46:14]** we are affected by this, but it's because **[00:46:18]** during election campaigns and similar events, **[00:46:23]** in countries like America or Western Europe, **[00:46:26]** these deepfakes are very common. **[00:46:31]** The latest challenge is language models. **[00:46:34]** Here, the question is to what extent you actually use **[00:46:39]** chatbots in your work or look up information **[00:46:46]** using these applications, how intensively you work with them. **[00:47:01]** Just to see. **[00:47:31]** It's clear that the frequency is high. **[00:47:42]** Generally, today you don't look for a single number **[00:47:50]** like 50%, 60%, or 70%, **[00:47:55]** so the number keeps growing. **[00:47:59]** What shows up as a problem with these models, **[00:48:08]** is that it's not a mess. **[00:48:12]** The number of users is growing, as I said, the number is not fixed. **[00:48:16]** If we looked for a number six months ago, **[00:48:20]** it would be lower than now, but many use it—students, **[00:48:24]** educators—which is probably fine. **[00:48:29]** Students are not prohibited from using these tools. **[00:48:35]** However, of course, it can't be used to have a thesis written by this tool. **[00:48:38]** But the problem, as it turns out, is that the data **[00:48:43]** you get access to is not always correct. **[00:48:48]** For example, there's research from the Journalists' Union, about a year old, **[00:48:56]** which indicates something. **[00:49:02]** Because those who work with the models know **[00:49:04]** that they are constantly improving, adding functionalities. **[00:49:07]** That means what you used a month ago, **[00:49:12]** a month later may have different features. **[00:49:14]** However, it was found that a high percentage **[00:49:17]** contains some kind of error, quite serious. **[00:49:21]** There are problems with sources, like referencing **[00:49:27]** nonexistent sources, **[00:49:33]** which today is a problem even for students, **[00:49:37]** who will source it there, but actually don't trust the sources **[00:49:41]** and then it turns out the sources don't actually exist. **[00:49:44]** There is an author, but that author never wrote the book, and so on. **[00:49:50]** So the reliability of these platforms is lower. **[00:50:00]** Yes, today global companies that have the capacity create their own platforms, **[00:50:08]** they have their own internal data, and they connect it with external data, **[00:50:13]** because you work with various data sets. **[00:50:20]** However, the question of reliability and accuracy of information **[00:50:27]** is quite fundamental and it's a problem, especially because the younger generation, **[00:50:35]** which learns mostly or tries to follow the easy path **[00:50:40]** and learn from these data, can have problems with it. **[00:50:47]** Another quite fundamental issue is the infection of these chatbots **[00:50:56]** and the infection of sources with distorted information **[00:51:01]** and disinformation and the like. As I mentioned earlier, **[00:51:04]** for example Russia, which has set a goal to dominate the information space, **[00:51:11]** they have various platforms, they create different websites, **[00:51:18]** which spread information that is not entirely accurate. **[00:51:23]** And it's not just a question of Russia, because Russia is relevant to us, **[00:51:28]** we have some historical experience, some geographical proximity, **[00:51:32]** but it's also a question of China, which has its own platform, **[00:51:38]** and if you ask about political issues or historical events, **[00:51:43]** the interpretation of those events will align with the politics **[00:51:48]** and be as the country's political leadership dictates. **[00:51:52]** The same goes for Iran, the same case. **[00:51:59]** So the problem is that these open platforms **[00:52:07]** learn from these data and in many cases learn from incorrect data **[00:52:12]** or data that someone has distorted. **[00:52:16]** That's the passive direction, but then there is the active direction. **[00:52:22]** Today we call it, I talked a lot about propaganda, **[00:52:27]** that today they came up with a new term, slopaganda, **[00:52:33]** which basically means spreading very low-quality information **[00:52:42]** or information that a state actor wants to get into the ether, **[00:52:48]** the state actor wants to promote it somehow. **[00:52:52]** It's spreading through social networks. **[00:52:56]** A large amount of information, spreading very fast. **[00:53:00]** So today we've moved from propaganda to this stage. **[00:53:06]** So on one hand, we have a large number of sources, **[00:53:12]** which are not entirely reliable. **[00:53:16]** We do have access to them in something like real time, **[00:53:21]** but unfortunately, the reflection is missing here. **[00:53:26]** That means, if you were truly working only with the online environment **[00:53:32]** and you don't have the chance to confront it, **[00:53:37]** you won't develop the habits that we went through, **[00:53:42]** like having some critical comparison of sources and so on, **[00:53:46]** you could end up in a situation where we produce people **[00:53:51]** who will be dependent on what is fed into these platforms. **[00:53:59]** As I mentioned earlier, today there are various tools **[00:54:05]** used by state actors or different interest groups. **[00:54:09]** This is called information laundering. **[00:54:12]** You place some misleading information somewhere on a small, **[00:54:17]** insignificant media outlet. **[00:54:20]** This information is then picked up by a broader, **[00:54:25]** larger audience, **[00:54:33]** and this information is then taken over by some state media **[00:54:37]** or media that have credibility, **[00:54:42]** and they unknowingly spread misleading information about it. **[00:54:49]** This is basically the method of spreading viruses in the 1980s. **[00:54:53]** Today, of course, it has technologically advanced to another level, **[00:54:57]** where in some Indian magazine, sponsored **[00:55:02]** by the then Soviet Union, this information was published **[00:55:05]** and subsequently picked up. **[00:55:07]** Of course, things had to respond to it and so on, **[00:55:11]** so it had to be dressed up with some kind of spin **[00:55:15]** and credible content. **[00:55:18]** But what is happening today is happening in a much more significant **[00:55:22]** and sophisticated way. **[00:55:24]** They create twins, meaning platforms are created **[00:55:28]** where you see logos of established media houses and think **[00:55:34]** you are on that media house's site, but you are actually on some other platform **[00:55:37]** that is pretending to be it. **[00:55:43]** You think you are on NATO's website, **[00:55:45]** but you are somewhere else and the site is run by someone else. **[00:55:49]** There were fakes with Seznam, where there was a site **[00:55:54]** that pretended to be Seznam, but Seznam was not behind it at all. **[00:55:58]** So, this is another thing we are exposed to. **[00:56:03]** To add a bit of pessimism or optimism at the end, **[00:56:10]** new technologies are coming to us, **[00:56:16]** quantum technologies, which today, we say, **[00:56:20]** are in the focus of discussions. **[00:56:23]** There was a time when social networks were being discussed here, **[00:56:26]** then 5G networks came along, and they were discussed. **[00:56:29]** Now there is a lot of discussion about artificial intelligence. **[00:56:32]** And soon we will have the topic of quantum technologies, which will actually change **[00:56:35]** the distribution of information altogether. They will enable the creation **[00:56:39]** of much higher quality deepfakes. **[00:56:43]** Content will spread faster. **[00:56:47]** But not only that, if these technologies fall into the hands of those with negative intentions, **[00:56:51]** on the other hand, it is also a certain challenge, **[00:56:59]** because with these technologies we will better monitor **[00:57:02]** the information space, monitor what is happening in that information **[00:57:09]** space. We will be able to analyze it, predict, **[00:57:14]** forecast impacts, predict the development **[00:57:19]** of certain campaigns. We will be able to decode and identify deepfakes **[00:57:23]** using these technologies. **[00:57:29]** So there is always that side: it has negatives, **[00:57:37]** but it also has positives. **[00:57:41]** So here, before I want to promote our publication, **[00:57:45]** this is basically the topic and the historical overview **[00:57:51]** that we outlined and created there, **[00:57:57]** which started sometime in ancient times and actually moved **[00:58:02]** up to modern times and reflects the topic. **[00:58:11]** And since it is about half a year old, today, **[00:58:19]** if we consider what has happened in the last six months, **[00:58:23]** we are in a slightly different situation again. **[00:58:27]** Nevertheless, this is for those of you who think about this **[00:58:31]** and say that we are in a completely different situation now. **[00:58:37]** Yes, we are, but basically this has existed long before us. **[00:58:42]** The only thing is that maybe we didn't realize it, **[00:58:48]** or the spread of various deceptions, conspiracy theories, **[00:58:51]** has always been here, but what is new today, **[00:58:55]** what is different today, is mainly the speed **[00:58:58]** and the quality of those deepfakes, disinformation, **[00:59:02]** and conspiracy theories, the visual form, **[00:59:08]** the appearance of supposedly physical people. **[00:59:12]** That is the difference. **[00:59:17]** The topic existed several hundred years before us in some form, **[00:59:19]** but today it is still here. **[00:59:24]** And what makes it different are precisely these technologies. **[00:59:34]** So I would stop here with this. **[00:59:37]** And of course, there is room for questions. **[00:59:47]** Subtitles created by JohnyX. **[01:00:00]** When there were these information wars and the fact that it opens up is a form of how to take over countries, **[01:00:12]** without a soldier's foot having to enter. And it's actually some kind of common practice. **[01:00:18]** So how does the gentleman defend against it, when we actually know it's happening, **[01:00:24]** when we see that there are victims of these activities and so on, **[01:00:32]** I have a feeling that we don't take it seriously enough. **[01:00:36]** History is characterized by the fact that people never learn from it. **[01:00:41]** That's the first somewhat pessimistic conclusion. **[01:00:47]** But as for events or non-events, the point is that today, if I really narrow it down **[01:00:56]** to the security field, the topic is here and it is being discussed, **[01:01:02]** and various simulations are being done, not only by our armies, **[01:01:10]** but worldwide, in the Alliance, they have specialized units, **[01:01:15]** centers of excellence that deal specifically with the information space. **[01:01:20]** For example, one important center of excellence is in Riga, **[01:01:25]** where experts meet every year and address issues, **[01:01:29]** what is happening in the information space, what new technologies are here, **[01:01:33]** what new narratives exist, and how to defend against them, **[01:01:38]** how to define boundaries against them. So this is definitely happening. **[01:01:46]** The question is that we are confronted with the fact that, for example, what is happening here today, **[01:01:54]** where this aspect of information danger is somewhat suppressed, **[01:02:01]** which has its reasons, but we are in a situation **[01:02:05]** where many people say yes, but we simply resign from **[01:02:09]** creating mechanisms or measures here, **[01:02:15]** to be more resilient to these foreign influences **[01:02:20]** and hostile influences. Today, resilience is a modern concept. **[01:02:28]** Resilience is a new term, resilience everywhere, resilience of critical infrastructure, **[01:02:35]** resilience of people, resilience against some physical hardship, **[01:02:40]** but also resilience against influence in the information space. **[01:02:48]** It probably works in Riga. I feel that when we were here at breakfast with Petra Horáková-Krištofová, **[01:02:55]** who described the Nordic countries, Estonia, and so on, **[01:02:59]** it seems better from my point of view, but really, when I look now, **[01:03:07]** I just got a report from Czech elves and saw what is actually happening here on the scene, **[01:03:14]** how things spread versus how we are able to stop it, **[01:03:19]** I just wonder if the few people in strategic communication, **[01:03:25]** because then it’s like shouting into the void when a tank is coming at you and you have a shovel **[01:03:31]** and want to stop it. **[01:03:35]** Certainly the Nordic countries, after the Baltics, have that historical experience, **[01:03:41]** so they have built preparation for people in schools, methodologies, and so on, **[01:03:50]** So it's comprehensive there, Finland, Sweden, the same countries, **[01:03:54]** which were closer to Russia and under some kind of influence, **[01:03:58]** because under greater pressure in the information space, they actually created **[01:04:03]** not only strategic communication, for example, the Swedes have departments of psychological expertise, **[01:04:09]** so not just that, but they took a more comprehensive approach. **[01:04:13]** Of course, a department of 15 people for strategic communication won't save you, **[01:04:18]** but it will ensure that the topic gets more into society, **[01:04:24]** into the individual parts like schools, state, nonprofits, everything. **[01:04:29]** It all plays like one orchestra. **[01:04:32]** I actually saw some numbers, and just now, **[01:04:38]** that Russia pumps roughly 3 to 10 billion dollars into the European space, **[01:04:44]** which is an enormous amount of money, **[01:04:49]** because it's all about money, about the media space. **[01:04:53]** Not counting the troll farms and everything else going on, **[01:04:56]** advertising and all these things are a big, how to say, enemy. **[01:05:03]** And I just think, because we've had many breakfasts here, **[01:05:09]** about what to do with it, but I feel it's no longer a matter for us citizens, **[01:05:13]** but that it's actually a state matter. **[01:05:16]** Exactly, because if we narrow it down to the Czech Republic, **[01:05:23]** and I don't want to say this topic, this story was here, **[01:05:28]** with the strategic communication department at the government office, **[01:05:31]** which after several years, when the previous government was here, **[01:05:35]** attempted to create some kind of commissioner, then they canceled it, then moved it, **[01:05:38]** then again, then they gave it back. **[01:05:40]** In this way, they kind of did a disservice, **[01:05:43]** because they questioned the very existence of this topic. **[01:05:48]** Because of course, yes, the topic must be addressed, we must deal with it, **[01:05:51]** but because it was constantly wavering, it simply didn't pass. **[01:05:56]** It turned out that we probably don't need it. **[01:06:00]** Another problem, and I actually talked about this at the beginning, **[01:06:02]** is the securitization of the topic. **[01:06:04]** It's important that the topic is accepted as a security risk. **[01:06:09]** The moment the topic is not accepted as a security risk, **[01:06:12]** there is a problem with it. **[01:06:13]** On one hand, it was communicated here that yes, it is a security risk, **[01:06:17]** but on the other hand, a significant part of society **[01:06:20]** actually did not accept it. **[01:06:21]** Likewise, part of the political spectrum did not accept it, **[01:06:24]** and it caused a counterproductive reaction in the form of **[01:06:28]** various platforms starting to form to defend freedom of speech, **[01:06:32]** Simply different groups, associations that oppose it. **[01:06:37]** And they are the counterpoint. **[01:06:41]** So somehow it didn't succeed in making this topic **[01:06:45]** a truly security issue. **[01:06:47]** Even though it's everywhere in the documents. **[01:06:49]** Today, if you opened them, although Andrej Babiš says, **[01:06:52]** we canceled strategic communication, I will communicate, **[01:06:55]** the ministers will communicate, but today one of the key documents, **[01:06:59]** which is actually the action plan to counter hybrid activities, **[01:07:03]** in that action plan it says that the Czech Republic will create, **[01:07:07]** or will build resilience, or will prevent **[01:07:10]** hostile influences, hostile propaganda, **[01:07:13]** and will strengthen the resilience of society. **[01:07:17]** So something else is written, but something else is done in reality. **[01:07:21]** You also said that Western countries face greater pressure from Russia. **[01:07:27]** Is there any way or method to measure this? **[01:07:32]** Because I assume if we look at Biska's reports, **[01:07:37]** it's quite clear who the hostile powers are **[01:07:41]** and who the Czech alphabets and so on are. **[01:07:44]** I can't really imagine how it could be worse here. **[01:07:49]** Also, how COVID accelerated it and this wave here, **[01:07:53]** that's another thing that probably didn't help at all. **[01:07:57]** So COVID, right. It accelerated it, yes. We talk about COVID as the first infodemic. **[01:08:02]** It was not just a pandemic, but an infodemic, **[01:08:04]** meaning an erosion of various information of different quality. **[01:08:08]** Overall, in Europe, they say there are three countries most under Russian pressure. **[01:08:14]** That's Poland, Germany, and France. **[01:08:17]** These are the core countries where the Russians invest a lot of money. **[01:08:22]** How to find out? Those countries have specialized units, **[01:08:28]** which study the information space from a technical perspective, **[01:08:32]** meaning they analyze on which IP addresses the sites are, **[01:08:36]** where it came from, who is pretending what. **[01:08:39]** So they examine the technical side and then somehow quantitatively evaluate it **[01:08:44]** and say it's some percentage. **[01:08:47]** At our Ministry of the Interior, I think there was something like that, **[01:08:51]** but today it's not that it's faded, but due to the situation, **[01:08:58]** the topic of disinformation has kind of receded again. **[01:09:05]** I imagine it a bit when our mutual acquaintance, **[01:09:10]** like Pepa Holý, actually says they reframed cybersecurity **[01:09:15]** to cognitive security, meaning that when there was cybersecurity, **[01:09:19]** So we can imagine someone in that dark cloak sending us viruses **[01:09:23]** and some malware into our machine, and we need to have a sufficiently protected **[01:09:27]** system, and every company, etc., probably understands this. **[01:09:31]** Cognitive security is actually much, much worse **[01:09:34]** and harder to grasp, because simply, **[01:09:37]** if we look at the news and many communicators now, **[01:09:44]** it's very interesting, and the narratives somehow, **[01:09:49]** how to say, don't fade and even revive, and it's something **[01:09:54]** that, in my opinion, should be somehow labeled. **[01:10:00]** So-called tagging is somewhat counterproductive because **[01:10:06]** I don't have the slides here, but it was proven that on Twitter, when experiments were done, **[01:10:16]** before Twitter, for example, the first Donald Trump election campaigns, **[01:10:21]** they tagged messages that they evaluated as not entirely kosher. **[01:10:28]** They didn't say these were disinformation, but they weren't kosher. **[01:10:33]** They tagged them, but interest in those messages was higher than in the untagged ones. **[01:10:40]** So they said it was even more counterproductive. **[01:10:48]** If we stick to what is written and given, **[01:10:53]** the issue is you must not spread hate speech on networks, you must not spread it, **[01:10:59]** but today an interesting book came out by Tomáš Koblížek, **[01:11:06]** Hate Speech, which he wrote with Jakub Kalenský, who was at the Center of Excellence in Helsinki, **[01:11:12]** a European platform that also deals with cognitive space. **[01:11:17]** And it's notable that in 2017, Andrej Babiš was there submitting an application and saying **[01:11:24]** how great it is that we have this here. And today, he doesn't really support it. **[01:11:30]** So tagging isn't really the solution. **[01:11:33]** Yes, as they say, every advice is expensive, but generally the problem is media literacy, **[01:11:41]** education in schools. It's a more complex issue. **[01:11:44]** You can't break it with just one effort. **[01:11:49]** So again, the problem is media education, and today, what comes up is **[01:11:58]** that, for example, Člověk v tísni provides some teaching materials to schools. **[01:12:02]** And they say to them, why is Člověk v tísni doing this, it's a political NGO and so on. **[01:12:09]** Well, but what's the problem? This should be done by the state. **[01:12:12]** Why is an NGO doing it? Because the state doesn't do it. **[01:12:16]** About two or three years ago, we were at the Ministry of Education, and they said **[01:12:21]** they are very interested in all this. And they said, well, the state has to do it. **[01:12:25]** The NGO can do it as a supplement. They can organize some event somewhere as a supplement. **[01:12:30]** But primarily, we have compulsory schooling, so the state must prepare some concept. **[01:12:36]** I'll get to your questions because there are many. **[01:12:40]** So when you actually mentioned Cambridge Analytica, **[01:12:44]** I feel that was a really interesting turning point, **[01:12:48]** that Brexit was really influenced, and not only that. **[01:12:54]** So here it is, and there are a few questions about your personal opinion on banning network use by minors? **[01:13:00]** Should access be regulated? **[01:13:05]** Then there's the question of simply being on social networks **[01:13:09]** and identifying yourself with some ID, whether that would be the solution. **[01:13:13]** Try to say something about it, what is being whispered and what might help? **[01:13:19]** Like regulation, because I come from the security community, **[01:13:25]** so we say that some regulation should definitely exist. **[01:13:32]** But it's primarily a family matter. **[01:13:36]** If today parents don't care about what their children do, **[01:13:42]** not only in physical life, but they don't even care **[01:13:48]** about what children do on social networks. **[01:13:52]** Because, as everyone says, I don't want to generalize, **[01:13:56]** but in families where parents are very busy, **[01:14:01]** they tell the kids to do this and they just do something and say, **[01:14:05]** so we have peace from them because we need to do some work now. **[01:14:09]** But primarily, the family should function like this here. **[01:14:13]** Unfortunately, we've reached a situation where states, **[01:14:17]** or the state, will probably have to step in with some regulation. **[01:14:21]** Because I think in many cases the family doesn't work. **[01:14:25]** They should monitor what the child is doing there, **[01:14:30]** or some measures should be taken. **[01:14:34]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:36]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:38]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:40]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:42]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:44]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:46]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:48]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:50]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:52]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:54]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:56]** So that's basically everything. **[01:14:58]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:00]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:02]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:04]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:06]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:08]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:10]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:12]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:14]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:16]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:18]** So that's basically everything. **[01:15:20]** covid, so that was here. And covid was quite an experience and at the same time **[01:15:50]** this showed things like different monetization of platforms, **[01:15:57]** they really earned a lot from ads, they made money from some **[01:16:03]** products like alternative medicine, the e-shops actually sold various alternative medicine, Chinese medicine. **[01:16:07]** A lot of money was made on all this. These are billion-dollar profits for Facebook, these are the numbers. **[01:16:15]** Maybe this is an interesting question, I don't know who asked it, but it doesn't matter. **[01:16:24]** What should we believe now or how to find truthful information when almost every **[01:16:30]** news outlet is actually dependent on someone? Do you have any tips? **[01:16:36]** That's a really interesting question when we talk, I don't know, **[01:16:42]** about a fund for independent journalism and so on. Now you see a brutal attack **[01:16:47]** on all kinds of news, Seznam, public media, and so on. **[01:16:52]** That means the space is shrinking, shrinking and actually distorting **[01:16:56]** even to their advantage, because that's exactly the art of war. **[01:17:01]** It's really interesting that we see it in the transmission of income. **[01:17:05]** So what do you watch then? What are your tips? **[01:17:09]** Tips, I don't want to promote any particular TV channel or platform, **[01:17:13]** because we are invited to various shows on different media and I wouldn't want to say here **[01:17:21]** that this medium is credible and that one is less credible, **[01:17:28]** but I actually said at the beginning. **[01:17:35]** A Dutch historian wrote an interesting book that basically ended with, **[01:17:38]** don't read any news at all and don't look at social media, **[01:17:42]** don't watch TV and you'll keep some mental balance. **[01:17:47]** But unfortunately, that's not how independence works, what is independence? **[01:17:52]** Independence doesn't exist, it's not absolute. **[01:17:57]** There is absolute truth and there is some absolute... **[01:18:01]** That's a philosophical question, philosophers would be needed here, **[01:18:05]** when they tell you that truth doesn't exist. **[01:18:08]** There is no true fact here, there is no true... **[01:18:12]** Because if it existed, we wouldn't need polarity in media, **[01:18:18]** we wouldn't need many platforms here. **[01:18:23]** If we had accepted some messages that we say, **[01:18:26]** these are true, then we wouldn't have to discuss anything here **[01:18:30]** and we could safely go back to before 1989, **[01:18:33]** where they would read you the news and say, **[01:18:36]** this is the truth, this is the truth, this is the truth. **[01:18:40]** So the truth is always relative and we always look at it from some perspective. **[01:18:47]** And then it's a question for each person how they are value-oriented. **[01:18:53]** What values they hold and what their value set is. **[01:18:58]** And simply based on that, they profile themselves and look for information **[01:19:03]** that actually aligns with their value set. **[01:19:07]** That's how it is. **[01:19:09]** I think Lukáš Hána, who is sitting here from Krimeš, **[01:19:12]** we'll talk a lot about this specific topic in our following discussion. **[01:19:19]** I highly recommend, if you are aware of your own value anchoring, **[01:19:25]** whether you are one way or another, you should also look into the second or third opinion spectrum **[01:19:31]** and simply get a picture of all of them. Don't just stay stuck in your bubble. **[01:19:34]** I think that's something that helps a lot. So broaden your sources. **[01:19:39]** Nice question. The history and trends of propaganda and manipulation were interesting. **[01:19:43]** Are there examples of successful defenses against them? **[01:19:47]** Defense always works through some kind of counter-propaganda. **[01:20:00]** You discredit the enemy and you have to create your own positive image. **[01:20:12]** Similarly, in wars, failures were concealed, **[01:20:18]** for example, during World War II, one side or the other concealed failures **[01:20:24]** and created a positive image of the situation. **[01:20:30]** We see the same today in the Ukraine and Russia wars, **[01:20:34]** where the presentation of the conflicts is one-sided on each side. **[01:20:39]** Each side acts as if it is winning and creates the image of the victor. **[01:20:46]** This is called security jargon, creating counter-propaganda, **[01:20:54]** which means downplaying the enemy's successes and exaggerating our own. **[01:21:03]** Napoleon did something like this during several periods, **[01:21:10]** where he effectively presented the results of the Battle of Waterloo and similar, **[01:21:15]** which he actually did not consider his defeat. **[01:21:20]** So it always has to be a proactive narrative. **[01:21:23]** It has to be the counter. **[01:21:25]** Vojta Štěpanek asks, don't social media bosses enable disinformation **[01:21:30]** by allowing people to create multiple profiles? **[01:21:33]** Or would mandatory identity verification be better? **[01:21:35]** The question is, identity verification would definitely help in some way. **[01:21:44]** I usually give the example of free discussions on some blogs or platforms, **[01:21:51]** where at one time no registration was required to join the discussion. **[01:21:56]** Some platforms that wanted to cultivate the discussion, **[01:21:59]** then required registration with an email, **[01:22:03]** so you were no longer completely anonymous, because before anyone could just insult others, **[01:22:07]** or spread misinformation there. **[01:22:11]** So it would definitely help in some way, **[01:22:17]** that there would be some degree of our own identity, **[01:22:22]** because it's different when you operate there and are connected with your own identity, **[01:22:27]** than when you are half an anonymous user in the group. **[01:22:31]** Let's not end on a completely dark note. **[01:22:34]** There is some light at the end of the tunnel. **[01:22:37]** But the light is that society somehow absorbs it. **[01:22:43]** And historically, we've had, **[01:22:48]** when I mentioned Czech Television, for example, at the end of 2000, **[01:22:51]** there was resistance, **[01:22:56]** but then it somehow returned, **[01:22:59]** and the situation normalized in the media. **[01:23:06]** So it's about the fact that even if you lend something to that space, **[01:23:12]** the audience has to believe it, **[01:23:15]** but then, when people don't believe everything, **[01:23:21]** when we talk about the media, **[01:23:26]** the audience will filter it. **[01:23:32]** Then there might be an outflow. **[01:23:36]** The social organism, **[01:23:41]** when you are sick, the organism doesn't succumb, **[01:23:45]** because it defends itself. **[01:23:47]** The social organism also defends itself initially. **[01:23:49]** It's like the human body. **[01:23:51]** I think we need to wait and see how the situation develops. **[01:23:59]** Thank you. **[01:24:02]** It was a bit darker than I expected, **[01:24:05]** but thank you very much, Tomáš. **[01:24:07]** Of course, thank you for the invitation. **[01:24:09]** As I said at the beginning, **[01:24:11]** I come from the security community, **[01:24:13]** and it's always dark. **[01:24:15]** It's always kind of dark. **[01:24:18]** So optimism there... **[01:24:22]** is hard to find. **[01:24:24]** Hard to find. **[01:24:26]** But let's not despair, as I say. **[01:24:30]** Society somehow functions, **[01:24:32]** and historically we know, **[01:24:34]** that it always led to... **[01:24:36]** Vlado was here in 1989, **[01:24:38]** so who would have thought in the 70s, **[01:24:42]** that in 15, maybe 20 years, some kind of upheaval will happen. **[01:24:47]** That's nonsense. **[01:24:49]** You take it from the perspective of those people. **[01:24:51]** Believe that you live in 1975 **[01:24:53]** and you'll say, **[01:24:55]** this is already set, it won't change. **[01:24:57]** And suddenly... **[01:24:59]** I think a good example is Hungary, for instance. **[01:25:01]** Or Hungary. **[01:25:03]** But Hungary would be cautious. **[01:25:05]** Of course, we all applauded here. **[01:25:07]** Today you see, **[01:25:09]** that after the elections, reactions are more sober. **[01:25:13]** You should have left it there. **[01:25:15]** So I'll stop now. **[01:25:17]** No, no, no, go on. **[01:25:19]** But sure, Hungary, **[01:25:21]** was an example that **[01:25:23]** you can't be Orbán in Hungary, **[01:25:29]** he was there for many years, **[01:25:31]** building his positions, **[01:25:33]** but society no longer accepts it, **[01:25:35]** it no longer absorbs it, **[01:25:37]** there is a push for change. **[01:25:39]** A new generation has grown up, **[01:25:41]** which says, **[01:25:43]** we don't want this. **[01:25:45]** The same happened in the 80s. **[01:25:47]** A delegation grew up here. **[01:25:49]** And of course, **[01:25:51]** the year 1989 is a bit more complicated, **[01:25:53]** but there was a generation that said, **[01:25:55]** we don't want this anymore.